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Abstract 
Rapid economic growth involves significant changes in land use patterns. The 
paper uses the recent history of Chinese economic growth to highlight and 
interrogate the implication of such changes within the context of structural 
transformation. It argues that though land use change is an important 
underlying dimension of the massive structural transformation accompanying 
China’s explosive economic growth, the dominant theoretical literature on 
structural change is not cognizant of this fact. It does so by looking at arable 
land conversion in coastal provinces (from agriculture to industry or urban 
development), the ‘Grain for Green’ land set-aside program to prevent soil 
erosion in central and western areas, and ‘wasteland’ reclamation particularly in 
the northwest. In so doing, it also argues for an integrated analysis that 
recognizes that land has a type of scarcity that arises from its location and not 
just its total availability at the national level, i.e. land here is not the same as 
land there. The paper shows that contrary to the implicit understanding of 
structural change literature and indeed development theory, the transition of 
land in China between its uses defies the dominant linear and unidirectional 
narrative. The three processes discussed here show that land–and population 
dependent on its livelihoods on these lands–move in different directions and 
purposes and these movements are shaped and determined by state vision of 
progress and development. 
Keywords 
China, land, state, structural change, economic growth. 
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Structural Change, Land Use and the State in China: 
Making Sense of Three Divergent Processes  
1 Introduction 
Especially since the early 1980s, China has followed a rapid path of economic 
growth. Economic growth figures for the past two decades (1980-90: 10.3%, 
1990-2003: 9.6%) are impressive by any standard and the Chinese government 
aims to quadruple the nation’s GDP by 2020, implying an average growth rate 
of 8 percent. Within the context of China’s unprecedented growth, land use 
change has received much attention (Deng et al. 2008; Deng et al. 2009; Huang 
et al. 2008, Yan et al. 2009; Eyferth et al. 2003). Most of this literature focuses 
on specific programs (e.g. Sloping Land Conversion Program (Xu et al. 2010; 
Uchida et al. 2005) or phenomena (e.g. conversion of agricultural land for 
purposes of urban industrial development (Su 2005, Tan et al. 2005; Liu et al. 
2010). Though empirically detailed, these analyses have not engaged with the 
broader interconnections and implications of the divergent processes of land 
use change in contemporary China. This paper fills this void by providing an 
integrated analysis of three concomitant processes involving land use change. 
Specifically, the paper looks at arable land conversion in coastal provinces 
(from agriculture to industry or urban development), the ‘Grain for Green’ 
land set-aside program to prevent soil erosion in central and western areas, and 
‘wasteland’ reclamation in China’s border provinces particularly in the 
northwest. 
The purpose is not to present new empirical evidence. Rather, by 
synthesizing the rich empirical literature, the paper highlights the importance 
of land use change as an important dimension of the structural transformation 
accompanying China’s impressive economic growth. In so doing, the paper 
also engages with the classical literature on structural transformation, which is 
drawn primarily from the discipline of economics. It argues that this literature, 
which focuses on the transfer of labour and capital from more traditional 
agricultural sector to modern industrial and service economy, has a blind spot 
when it comes to land, particularly its movement between different productive 
purposes. The paper makes four interrelated arguments regarding the role of 
land in structural change that accompanies economic growth. 
As a starting point, it’s important to note that the structural change 
literature does not consider the supply of land–as a productive resource–as a 
constraint to economic growth. Instead, it simply deals with the productive 
capacity of land for agricultural purposes, in other words its fecundity, which is 
indeed perceived as a constraint. However, this constraint is expected to 
disappear as structural change leads to industrialization. The physical supply of 
land–as space–and also its particular location–as place–which is required for 
the construction of factories, urban residential districts for factory workers, 
infrastructure for transportation, etc., is not brought under scrutiny. As a 
result, the structural change literature is unable to grapple with the agricultural, 
socioeconomic and environmental implications of structural change that leads 
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to industrial development. By juxtaposing the three processes unfolding in 
contemporary China, the paper aims to demonstrate the importance of paying 
attention to land and its physical availability to understand the process of 
structural change and economic development.  
The second argument concerns the direction of movement of land 
between different productive purposes. Within the classical structural change 
literature, the movement of land is implicitly assumed as taking place in a 
unidirectional manner. Specifically, since economic growth is envisioned as a 
process leading to industrial development, the shift in land use is expected to 
move from agricultural production to industry (and its associated needs such as 
transport infrastructure, residential development, etc.). Because land is 
conceptualized solely in terms of its potential for supporting agricultural 
production, the existing literature is not capable to capture other ‘states’ of 
land, namely as ‘wasteland’ or ‘nature’. As the processes taking place in China 
demonstrate, land can also move to and fro between agriculture and these 
other two states. In particular, the process of land reclamation demonstrates 
how land that is traditionally considered as ‘waste’ – thus as economically 
unproductive – can be ‘reclaimed’ and moved into agricultural production. 
Similarly, the discussion of ‘Grain for Green’ program shows that land is also 
moved out of agricultural production not to industry but to the provision of 
ecosystem services (e.g. flood prevention). Just as classical approaches to 
structural change fail to consider the potential of ‘wastelands’, they also are not 
able to account for the necessity and, therefore, value of ecosystem services 
which are now acknowledged as critical for economic growth. By 
demonstrating the existence and salience of these alternative paths for the 
movement of land, the paper highlights their importance for the construction 
of a more robust theory of structural transformation. 
Classical theories of structural change depict the transition of an economy 
from a poor agrarian structure to a more affluent industrial one as a natural 
and teleological process. To the extent that the state enters these discussions, it 
is to argue that it can help prepare the groundwork for such a transition or that 
it ‘facilitates’ it by managing its social and political side effects. This 
oversimplification of state role and function is the third leg of the argument of 
this paper, namely that the state in China is central to the planning, 
management and execution of structural transformation and its effect on land 
use. In initiating, undertaking and overseeing a set of complex processes, the 
state in China might indeed be following the same simplistic model of 
structural change espoused by classical theories. The paper argues that 
structural change involves numerous politically motivated decisions (i.e. 
regarding the location of industry, design of ecosystem service provision, etc.) 
taken by the state that cannot simply be explained by reference to simple 
economic precepts dictating the necessity of structural change. 
The fourth and final point emerging from these previous three insights is 
that an integrated analysis of the variety of land use changes in China is 
essential to a sound understanding of the social, environmental, and political 
impacts of the process of China’s rapid economic growth. Such an integrated 
analysis would need to recognize that land has a type of scarcity that arises 
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from its location and not just its total availability at the national level, i.e. land 
here is not the same as land there. 
2 Structural Change 
This paper engages with the literature on structural change that has been 
articulated by, inter alia, Fisher (1939), Clark (1940), Kuznets (1965; 1966) and 
Chenery and Syrquin (1975). While it has its roots in the classical tradition of 
economics, the inquiry of structural change has flourished as a research 
program with these authors, whose work remains central to the contemporary 
understanding of economic growth and its determinants. Broadly speaking, 
structural change can be understood to include the entire range of 
transformative processes that accompany economic growth such as the 
changes in sectoral composition of production and employment, organization 
of the industry, financial system, income and wealth distribution, and 
demography (Matsuyama 2008). However, at its core is the accumulation of 
physical and human capital and the changes in the sectoral composition of the 
economy. 
Rather than a theoretical framework, the literature on structural change is 
built upon a set of careful analyses of empirical evidence that demonstrate 
some robust trends within a country during a period of sustained economic 
growth.  Kuznets (1965, 1966) documents how along with increase in per 
capita income, the share of agriculture declines in the national product and in 
employment with a corresponding increase in the share of industry and 
services. This trend was found to hold both in the context of time series data 
for individual countries and in cross-sectional data for different countries. 
On a more analytical level, Lewis (1954), following the classical tradition in 
economics, explains the central dynamics of growth in an economy in terms of 
the movement of labour from the rural agricultural to the urban industrial 
sector in response to a higher wage rate (traditional/modern?). A corollary to 
this movement is the same change in the relative weights of the agricultural 
and non-agricultural sectors in the economy that Kuznets established. This 
idea of structural change is not tied exclusively to a capitalist system either 
theoretically or empirically. The literature on Soviet industrialisation (e.g. 
Erlich, 1950; Ellman, 1975) is replete with references to transfer of resources 
like labour and commodities from agriculture to industry. 
Interestingly, the entire literature on structural change and economic 
growth does not deal with the issue of transfer of land between its different 
uses. This is clearly the case with Kuznets (1965: 250) in his discussion of the 
role of agriculture in economic growth. He states that agriculture can make 
three types of contributions: “a product contribution” (through self/internal 
growth), “a market contribution” (through trade with other sectors), and “a 
factor contribution” (through a transfer of resources to other sectors). It would 
be reasonable to expect that land would be one such factor, which could be 
transferred, or contributed in his parlance, to another sector such as industry. 
Yet, Kuznets limits these factors to two, namely “capital, that is, funds for 
financing acquisition of material capital, [and] labor” (ibid). Not only this 
otherwise sound discussion does not bring up land as a resource that gets 
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transferred between different sectors, it does not attempt to explain its 
absence.  
Evidence of such omission abound in the literature. In his discussion of 
the relationship between agriculture and modernizing economic growth, 
Timmer (1988: 289) critiques the ‘extractivist’ view of agriculture, which 
envisions its contribution solely in terms of providing “[s]urplus labor, surplus 
savings, and surplus foreign exchange to buy the machines to make them” in 
order to “fuel the drive for modernization”. Arguing instead for an 
interventionist policy for supporting agriculture-led development, Timmer 
nevertheless does not pay sufficient attention to land beyond its significance 
for agricultural production. In other words, for Timmer, the supply of land is 
only a relevant concern for agriculture, since it is “the only major sector that 
uses the land surface as an essential input into its production function” (1988: 
296). In formal neoclassical modeling, land is similarly characterized as of being 
useful solely for agriculture. For instance, Laitner’s model to explain the 
dynamics of savings behaviour in the economy within the context of structural 
change starts with an assumption that “[o]nly agriculture uses land” (Laitner, 
2000: 545). In short, land is considered a relevant factor of production for 
agriculture alone and therefore the intersectoral dynamics that is associated 
with structural change does not have to deal with it.  
This brief overview shows that for the structural change literature the role 
of land is only considered from the vantage point of agriculture and no other 
uses are envisioned for it (e.g. industry). It is important to understand the 
rationale behind this position. In explaining how an economy moves from 
rural agricultural to urban industrial character, the structural change literature 
makes an implicit assumption that the land necessary to locate industrial 
facilities (factories, urban infrastructure, housing for workers, etc.) is in 
abundant supply and therefore does not impinge on land necessary for other 
productive purposes (e.g. agriculture). This assumption would be valid in 
principle if the specific location of industry were immaterial. In other words, if 
location did not matter, ‘land here is the same as land there’ and there would 
always be some land available to set up industries. Moreover, it was assumed 
(and rightly so, to an extent) that industrial production, being much less land 
intensive than agriculture, would require negligible quantities of land. Together, 
these provided the grounds to assume that there was no binding land 
constraint to the process of growth via industrialization. 
To the extent that land constraints were taken into account, these were 
thought of primarily through the lens of agricultural productivity. Specifically, 
it was anticipated that intensification of agricultural production would in the 
long term deplete the fertility of land. Furthermore, it was initially believed that 
the growth process would be “protected from the braking effect of this law by 
the shift away from agricultural inputs to other natural resources” and later the 
constraint was kept out of sight using a “fixed coefficient production function 
approach” (Doornbos et al., 2000: 3). Related to this view of the natural 
constraints on production processes (i.e. agricultural) is the absence of any 
consideration of the functions played by nature – as an integrated system – in 
supporting economic life. 
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At the initial stages of industrialization, the relative abundance of land and 
therefore its easy availability for expanding the industrial base of an economy 
meant that potential tensions between competing uses of land were less likely 
to occur or to be perceived as a major stumbling block. However, upon the 
attainment of a threshold level of economic maturity and associated industrial 
intensification, this would cease to be true and competition for land among its 
alternative uses becomes manifest. In addition, three interrelated contemporary 
dynamics further exacerbate the tension arising from the competition between 
the different uses of land. Across the developing world the period since the 
Second World War has seen several waves of democratization (O’Donnell et 
al., 1986). Despite its weaknesses, this process has lent a voice to marginalized 
and disenfranchised sections of many developing societies. This, coupled with 
the rise of what has been termed the ‘network society’ (Castells, 1996), has 
often enhanced the abilities of these communities to share and articulate their 
concerns and grievances regarding the shifts taking place between the different 
uses of land. Paralleling these trends has been the growing awareness of the 
impact of development processes on the world’s ecosystems. Within the 
context of land use tensions, this has introduced an additional variable 
concerning the viability and desirability of transferring land between its 
different potential uses (Adams, 1990). Lastly, the entire development project, 
which has been envisioned through industrial economic growth, has come 
under increasing scrutiny and criticism from various quarters and 
constituencies (Rist, 2009). All this has meant that rampant transfer of land 
between its different uses has become much more contentious and therefore in 
need of better analysis. 
As the proceeding section will demonstrate within the context of China’s 
rapid economic growth, such an analysis needs to pay attention to at least three 
separate tensions arising from land use change. The first concerns the shift of 
land from agriculture to industry. This arises not from the absolute scarcity of 
land at the national level but rather the specific location at which land for 
industrial development (defined broadly to include factories, transport 
infrastructure and housing) is necessary. Specifically, China’s long standing 
‘coastal development strategy’ that has, among other concerns, sought to take 
advantage of easy transport connections with export markets has resulted in a 
clash between the region’s need for additional space for industrial growth and 
the needs of peasant farmers to retain possession of agricultural land 
surrounding urban centers. The second tension arises from the recently 
apprehended need to sustain the health of ecosystems, which, having come 
under increasing stress during industrial development, are necessary to sustain 
the conditions required for future growth. In the case of China, this paradox 
has most clearly manifested itself during the catastrophic floods of 1997 and 
has resulted in the central government’s massive undertaking to create a ‘green 
belt’ by converting agricultural land to forests for conservation purposes. The 
final tension arises partly out the need to expand land available for agricultural 
production and partly due to complex political considerations regarding the 
control over national territory as a whole. The case of Xinjiang clearly 
demonstrates how the reclamation of what has been ‘wastelands’ has not only 
created vast swathes of ‘new’ arable land but has also been accompanied by 
intense political and sociocultural conflict. 
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3 Processes and Programs 
This section provides a brief overview of three separate processes and analyzes 
their progress and impact. Since the manifestation of each process can be 
observed at its clearest in a certain geographical area, the analyses in this 
section are accordingly focused on specific regions in China that have been 
affected. For each process, we provide a brief historical overview, present 
relevant data on size and nature of change, discuss the role of the state and 
evaluate the nature of impact on various stakeholders. 
3.1 Industrialization 
Especially since the economic reforms starting in 1978, China has been 
undergoing a process of urbanization and industrialization that has few, if any, 
parallels in pace and magnitude. Its recent economic performance has been 
outstanding with an average growth rate of almost 10 percent annually. Much 
of this growth has come from rapid industrial expansion, which required, along 
with capital and labour, significant input of land upon which factories and 
related infrastructure could be built. The parallel influx of labour into these 
industrial centers, in turn, has created massive and rapid urbanization. A 
significant proportion of land converted for these two interrelated purposes 
has come from cultivated agricultural land.  
There is some ambiguity on the exact magnitude of this change but by all 
counts it is significant. The pace at which arable land is converted has been 
very rapid especially since 1995 with 5.4 million hectares, or approximately 3 
percent of the national total, being lost only during the period between 1996 
and 2003 (Lichtenberg and Ding, 2008). Millions of peasant families cultivating 
have been displaced as their arable land was acquired for urban industrial 
development. One estimate puts the number of farming families losing their 
land for alternative uses to 2 million a year (He et al., 2009). Land conversion 
of this magnitude has escalated social tensions, often leading to violence. The 
government response has ranged from rehabilitation and compensation 
packages for the displaced peasants to administrative measures for forcibly 
putting down social unrest (Su, 2005). 
The coastal provinces of Guangdong, Jiangsu and Zhejiang as well as the 
areas surrounding the urban districts of Beijing-Tianjin and Shanghai are some 
of the most prominent examples of conversion of arable land to industry. In 
this section, the paper focuses on the Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei (BTH) region, one 
of the most prosperous as well as fast growing areas in China located along the 
northwestern coast, to better explain the mechanisms behind this process and 
to discuss its impacts. 
The BTH region is comprised of the two municipalities of Beijing and 
Tianjing which are under the direct administrative control of the central 
government as well as the Hebei province. Through the 1990s the BTH region 
grew at an astonishing rate of 12.2 percent per year, more than doubling the 
regional GDP (Tan et al., 2005), a trend that continues into the 2000s. A 
significant portion of the region has been urbanized in the last two decades 
including the areas around the mega-cities of Beijing and Tianjing as well as 
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those around other urban centres of Hebei province. It also constitutes one of 
the three main industrial belts in the country contributing more than 10 
percent of the national GDP in 2009. Along with its industrial importance, the 
region has also been a significant agricultural producer with 17.5 percent of its 
regional domestic product coming from the primary sector in 1990. However, 
in the two decades since then, this percentage has come down to a mere 6.7 
(NBS, 1991, 2009) showing a marked structural change with a decreasing role 
of agriculture in the regional economy. This process is accompanied by a 
corresponding change in the allocation of resources including labour and land.   
According to a study carried out on the basis of remote sensing data (Tan 
et al., 2005), the BTH region has seen an extraordinary increase of 71 percent 
in its urban area between 1990 and 2000. Beijing’s urban landscape more than 
doubled in the same time period. About three-quarter of the addition to urban 
land was due to the conversion of cropland. A study covering the Eastern 
coastal provinces (including the BTH) for the period 1996-2005 reports that 
the rate of arable land loss picked up by more than 400 percent in the period 
2001-2005 in comparison to the earlier five years between 1996-2000 (Yansui 
et al., 2008). Specifically for Hebei province, the most agriculturally active area 
in the BTH region, the land loss in the 2000s was almost 10 times that in the 
later half of the 1990s. Beijing also lost huge tracts of arable land between 
2001-2005 due to an urban sprawl resulting from the infrastructure 
development related to the 2008 Olympics. 
The trends discussed above are indicative of a shift which is now extended 
to parts of China beyond the coastal provinces. During this process, millions 
of peasants have been dispossessed from their agricultural land and have joined 
China’s urban industrial labour force. They have not always been adequately 
compensated or appropriately rehabilitated (Su, 2005). Peasants who have been 
displaced have rarely found employment in the new sites of production that 
occupy their lands, forcing them to join the ranks of China’s vast army of 
internal migrants. 
As is the case with any other major socio-economic phenomenon, the 
Chinese state has been inextricably linked to the process of land conversion 
since the pre-reform period of 1978. In the pre-reform period, most land was 
collectively owned at the local level. There were multi-year development plans 
at the central and the local government level with specific growth targets. 
When land was required for industrial or infrastructure development in 
conjunction with the plan targets, the local government acquired land from the 
farmers and allocated it for its intended use. The farmers were mostly 
compensated with non-agricultural jobs in state owned enterprises and often 
offered an urban residency status (hukou) which came with an attractive 
package of social services which were not available to rural residents (Ding, 
2007). 
After 1978, a process of de-collectivization started restoring a peasant-
based egalitarian agricultural system with some safeguards for intergenerational 
demographic change (Griffin, 1984). While the actual ownership of agricultural 
land still rested with the village collective, it was leased out to individual 
households under the Household Responsibility System (HRS) thereby 
granting them long-term user rights. As we have noted above, the process of 
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land conversion intensified in this period with high rates of economic growth 
and urbanization. The institutional set up for administering land conversion 
changed substantially with the formulation of the Land Administration Law 
(LAL) in 1986 (with major amendments in 1998 and 2004) that provided 
guidelines for land acquisition from farmers for conversion to non-agricultural 
use. The LAL contained detailed provisions regarding compensation of 
farmers who lose their land as well as some measures to help their 
rehabilitation in alternative sectors. The compensation was initially fixed 
between 3-6 times the annual values of output. In subsequent amendments, 
this went up to 6-10 times of the annual value of output (Ding, 2003; 2007). 
Along with the LAL, another important legislation in the area of land 
conversion and development was the Basic Farmland Protection Regulation of 
1994. In face of the fast depletion of cultivated land in the previous decade, the 
Farmland Protection Regulation was put in place to check the rampant 
conversion of prime farmland and maintain China’s self-reliance in food 
production. The regulation prohibited the acquisition and conversion of 
certain categories of prime agricultural land for non-agricultural use.  
The process of land conversion has been far from smooth. The popular 
response to agricultural land conversion and acquisition has ranged from 
willing acceptance to violent resistance. In recent times public demonstrations 
and protests related to forced land ‘takings’ have reached a new high (Zhu and 
Prosterman, 2007). There have been frequent reports of public outrage related 
to land disputes in the form of violent clashes with police or the land mafia1. In 
the pre-reform period before the advent of the HRS, the sense of individual 
entitlement on land hardly existed. Therefore the sense of loss for having to 
give up land was minimal. Moreover, such moves often came with the 
opportunity of an urban job with associated benefits for the farmers.  
The situation changed fundamentally after the HRS established a deeper 
connection of peasants with their allotted land. Although provisions for 
compensation as well as resettlement were enacted through the LAL, there 
were several reasons for discontent regarding land acquisition or expropriation. 
First, the individual peasant whose land was being acquired has little say in 
deciding about the industrial or infrastructural projects that necessitated land 
conversion. Technically, rural land including farmland is owned by the local 
collective at the village level and decisions about land acquisition finally rest 
with this collective. But since the local governments merely represent the local 
population and are not constituted by it, there are always possibilities of 
perverse incentives for the local authorities to enter into deals that serve 
narrow interest of the leaders and not that of the entire population. Second, 
there is a common grievance that the compensation paid for expropriated land 
is not enough for rehabilitation. Typically six to ten times the annual value of 
production was paid as compensation. However, given the artificially 
depressed price of agricultural produce, the compensation amount might fall 
way short of the market value of the plot of land. Third, even the amount fixed 
                                                 
1 See for example a news report on the violent incident in Shengyou village in Hebei 
province in 2005 in which 6 villagers were killed resisting an armed group sent to 
force them out of their own land (http://www.terradaily.com/news/china-
05zzzzt.html). 
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as compensation is not entirely received by the individual farmers. Ding (2007) 
reports how in the case of land acquired for a project outside an Eastern 
coastal city, farmers received merely 26 percent of the total land development 
benefits while the rest were shared by the city government, the village 
government and the central government. Studies discuss the fiscal interests 
that the local governments have in pushing forward land procurement deals 
sometimes in detriment of the farmers’ interest (Man and Hong, 2010). 
3.2 Sloping Land Conversion Programme 
Conversion for urban industrial development is not the only process through 
which land has been taken out of agriculture. A large and ambitious 
afforestation programme in China’s central and western regions has also 
resulted in more agricultural land being converted. The roots of this 
programme can be found in the massive draught of 1997 and devastating 
floods in 1998 along the Yangtze river that killed over 3000 people and caused 
massive damage. Upstream deforestation emerged as the primary explanation 
used by governmental agencies to account for these disasters, prompting the 
central government to draw up an ambitious plan to increase the forest cover 
along with the conservation of the existing forest land. The Grain for Green 
programme (GFG) or the Sloping Land Conversion Programme (SLCP) was 
started in 1999 as a pilot project and was extended across the country by the 
end of 2002. The main objective was to provide incentive to farmers in the 
highly sloped areas of the Yangtze and Yellow river basins to set aside part or 
whole of their agricultural land for forestry purposes.  
According to official plans of the GFG programme, 14.7 million hectares 
of farmland are scheduled to be converted to forest between 1999 and 2010 
(Yue et al., 2010). This conversion will affect an estimated 50 million 
households (Uchida et al., 2007). The programme also has a ‘soft target’ of 
afforesting an equal area of wasteland. Structural adjustment of China’s land-
based economy (Demurger et al., 2009), poverty reduction (Xu et al., 2010) as 
well as safeguarding water resources and promoting sustainable development 
(Peng et al., 2007) are other objectives of the programme. The GFG is the 
largest cultivated land set-aside program in the developing world and also has 
organic links with other major interventions in China’s inland provinces, most 
importantly the Great Western Development Plan. It was formulated and 
implemented at a time when China was producing a major surplus of 
foodgrains (Xu et al. 2010) and, given the healthy state of the economy, had 
the funds required to run a programme as large as the GfG (Liu et al., 2008). 
In the first four years (1999-2003), almost 35 billion RMB was spent on the 
programme. 
There is a specific slope threshold for land to be included in the 
programme. It is 25 degrees in South-West China and 15 degrees in the North-
West. By targeting high slope areas, which are characterized by lower 
productivity, it was expected that loss of grain production would be 
significantly minimized. However, there are inconsistencies in the way these 
thresholds are applied and there is evidence that local authorities exercise 
considerable discretion in including areas for conversion. Given the vast 
financial resources harnessed for this program by the national government and 
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the limited resources controlled by local governments, the latter have seen the 
GfG as a potential source of much needed financing and hence has 
aggressively earmarked land for the project (Xu et al., 2004). Nevertheless, Yin 
et al. (2005) report that there is a negative correlation between the productivity 
of plots and their likelihood for selection indicating that implementation 
followed the guidelines relatively closely.  
The GfG was designed as an incentive based voluntary programme where 
the decision to participate or not rests with individual farmers whose land meet 
the criteria for conversion. By appealing to individual incentives and 
combining them with market forces, the GFG is an important break from past 
practice. However, there is uncertainty regarding the precise mechanism 
through which participants are selected. Although in principle, participants 
self-select themselves, Bennett (2008), suggest that participation is decided by 
local government officials. Only 62 percent of the participating households 
interviewed for a survey in 2003 report that they had autonomy to decide on 
their participation. Only 30 percent had a choice about the specific plots that 
they wanted to retire under the programme (Xu et al., 2010).  
The state policy of implementing the GFG project requires that peasant 
incomes must not decrease after the conversion of cultivated lands to 
forestlands or grasslands. (Peng et al., 2007). Three types of payments or 
subsidies are given to the peasants: in kind payments of grains to replace lost 
production, annual cash payments to help with the process of transition and 
free seedlings at the time of planting. The length of the payments depends on 
the type of conversion. ‘Ecological forests’, which are timber-producing 
forests, will be supported for 8 years. ‘Economic forests’ on the other hand, 
will be supported only for 5 years but the peasants are allowed to harvest non-
timber forest products. In addition, there was also a conscious aim to move a 
section of the farmers away from crop production and provide them with 
alternative means of livelihood through livestock rearing and other off-farm 
work (Xu et al., 2004). 
As a programme, it is difficult to accurately characterize the nature of the 
GfG. On the one hand, it makes use of ‘payments for ecosystem services’ 
(PES) type of internvention, which can be read as evidence of a new phase in 
Chinese environment and development policies (Xu et al., 2010). Specifically, 
while such policies are often executed in a top-down fashion through large-
scale campaigns that mobilize the citizens to fulfill goals set by central 
planners, the PES approach is generally considered to be a market-based policy 
that requires relatively low levels of state involvement beyond initial design and 
set-up. However, despite the prevalence of monetary incentives that follow the 
PES model, the evidence suggests that the GFG “appears to be in practice just 
another in a long line of topdown, campaign-style programs implemented by 
China’s central government” (Xu et al., 2010: 241) 
While the environmental impact of the GFG in terms of the increase of 
forest cover and the prevention of soil erosion is largely positive, the evidence 
on the socio-economic impact is mixed. A study based on survey data from 
three provinces in which the Gfg was first implemented, namely Sichuan, 
Shaanxi and Gansu, finds that participants have gained significantly in terms of 
their income from livelihoods compared to the non-participants. At the same 
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time, predictably, crop income has suffered a significant fall. The effect on the 
total income was ambiguous (Uchida et al. 2007). Interestingly, the labour 
allocation in terms of employment in the off-farm sector did not show any 
significant change. In terms of food grain production, the effect of the 
programme has been shown to be quite small. The impact on price is also non-
existent (Xu et al., 2006).  
No comprehensive data is available on the impact of the programme over 
the entire period since its inception. Existing studies focus almost exclusively 
on technical assessments of the efficiency and efficacy of the GFG project, 
analyzing a variety of indicators that dovetail the technicist mindset behind 
such megaprojects (see, among others Chen et al., 2007). Whereas many 
studies have assessed the ecological and socioeconomic effects of the GfG 
they are mostly scattered, fragmented, and short-term. 
Overall, the available evidence suggests that–at least according a narrow 
set of considerations–the program has been successful. However, concerns 
remain about its long term viability, partly because of the survival rates of trees, 
which have been lower than expected in certain areas (Bennett, 2008), and 
partly because there is fear that peasants will revert back to farming upon the 
termination of the support systems. Moreover, the tension between the 
environmental and economic goals of the programme poses questions about 
the long-term viability of the GfG. In this context, it has been argued that “the 
stated dual goals of poverty alleviation could be adversely affecting the 
program’s environmental efficiency, since it could be allowing local leaders to 
selectively deemphaszie the program’s environmental goals when these prove 
difficult to obtain” (Bennett, 2008). Nevertheless, the program has been 
extended for 2-8 years at the cost of another 210 billion yuan (Liu et al., 2008). 
3.3 Wasteland reclamation2 
A counter trend of land use change relates to the reclamation of arid lands in 
China’s border provinces. In provinces such as Heilongjiang, Inner Mongolia, 
Gansu and Xinjiang, a process of converting what has been termed 
‘wastelands’ has long been at work. Such conversion, however, has vastly 
intensified since the establishment of the People’s Republic in 1949. Between 
1979 and 1995, more than 11 million hectares of land has been added to 
China’s stock of arable land through wasteland reclamation with much of this 
increase coming from the provinces above (Ash and Edmonds, 1998). The 
case of Xinjiang is emblematic of the goals, means and outcomes of wasteland 
reclamation in contemporary China. Covering one sixth of China’s landmass, 
Xinjiang is the largest political unit in the country. Testifying to its remote, 
borderland status that makes it a neighbor to Mongolia, Pakistan, Kazakhstan, 
Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Kashmir, its name literally translates as ‘New 
Frontier’. At the time of the Chinese revolution, the population of Xinjiang 
                                                 
2 The research underlying this chapter is part of the project Changing Livelihood Strategies in 
Rural Xinjiang: Cotton Production, Environment and Poverty Reduction (Project Nr. 
07CDP028; 2007-10), financed by the Royal Dutch Academy of Sciences (KNAW), in 
cooperation with the Xinjiang Agricultural University, with support from the Nanjing 
Agricultural University. 
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was 90 percent non-Han, with Uyghurs, who are Muslims and speak a Turkic 
language, making up the majority of its 12 minority groups. 
The vast expanse of mostly arid land in Xinjiang has been the object of 
plans for agricultural expansion at least since the Qing dynasty. These plans 
have been systematically put into place since the 1950s, creating an ambitious 
yet largely unspoken project of land reclamation and population resettlement. 
While concrete data is difficult to obtain, the project's impact is most easily 
seen in population figures (Spoor and Xiaoping, 2009). In 1953, the population 
of Xinjiang was under 5 million with the Uyghurs comprising approximately 75 
percent. By 1990, the total population had grown to just over 15 million with 
the Uyghur population making up 47.5 percent. The remarkable growth of 
Xinjiang's Han population from 300000 in 1953 to 6,500,000 in 1995 is a 
testament to the scale and effectiveness of this program. While a significant 
portion of this new population have settled in urban centers such as Urumqi 
and Korla and work outside the rural sector, irrigated land reclamation has 
been a major driving force in attracting Xinjiang's new population. 
Land reclamation began with the process of demobilizing the People’s 
Liberation Army based in the province. A significant proportion of these 
soldiers, which were there to ‘liberate’ Xinjiang and its predominantly Uyghur 
population from its ‘feudal’ system, were settled into the region to work for the 
Xinjiang Wilderness Reclamation Army. Following the completion of their 
military task, the military personnel were kept in Xinjiang to continue 
reclaiming arid land and expand agricultural production. These new farmers 
were then brought under the control of the Xinjiang Production and 
Construction Corps (XPCC), which began to operate the bingtuan farms, 
otherwise known as regiment farms or state farms. Similar processes were put 
into practice in other frontier provinces such as Heilongjiang and Inner 
Mongolia. 
While most commentators on Chinese agriculture and particularly those 
working with Xinjiang and the larger western region agree that “[e]ven the 
simplest statistics (such as the total number of state farms) have enough 
discrepancies to vex the researcher” (Woodward, 1982) and that there are 
“inherent difficulties in using official data”, Shen and Lei’s figures on opened 
up wasteland is worthy of replicating here: 
TABLE 1 
 Opened up wasteland in Xinjiang 1950-1990 
 
The most recent phase of land reclamation in Xinjiang is most accurately 
discussed within the context of ongoing economic changes in China and their 
ramifications for landlocked western areas that have long been comparatively 
poorer than their coastal counterparts. The impressive pace of China’s 
economic growth since the 1980s has not helped the conditions in Xinjiang 
and the rest of western provinces, since the development strategy pursued by 
 17
the state focused explicitly on creating industrial development in coastal areas. 
This resulted in the further intensification of the regional socioeconomic 
differences, prompting the authorities in Beijing to develop a plan to tackle it. 
This ambitious project has been called the ‘Great Western Development 
Strategy’ (XibuDaKaifa) and is also often referred to as the ‘Open Up the 
West’ campaign (Becqeulin, 2004). In addition to Xinjiang, which is claimed to 
be its most important component (ibid: 364), it involves several other 
provinces such as Tibet and Gansu that together comprise most of the poorest 
and landlocked parts of China.  
Shen and Lei assert that the period since 1991 has seen further opening up 
of wastelands, though at a slower pace. During this period, private companies 
too have joined the reclamation efforts, though there is no available data on 
the amount. According to ‘Land Use Overall Plan of 2010 to 2030’ prepared 
by counties (xian) and regiments (tuan), there are further plans to reclaim land 
in the region. These plans, in turn, fall within the larger ongoing XUAR-wide 
effort to boost the region’s production of cash crops through initiatives such 
as the ‘6311’ 3 plan that sets ambitious targets for the increase of the region’s 
production of almond, jujube, apricot, etc. (Spoor and Xiaoping 2010). 
According to policy makers in Xinjiang, the goal is to ‘export’ these products 
to the rest of China, where Xinjiang’s fruits are renowned for their quality, as 
well as to the outside world. While there is no data to confirm whether the 
XPCC continues to perform land reclamation at a large scale, evidence from a 
recent survey conducted by a team of researchers that include the authors 
suggests that for Uyghur peasants who seek to expand their land size, 
reclamation remains an important option. The expanded and improved 
irrigation network being built as part of the ‘Open Up the West’ campaign 
makes such expansion a realistic possibility by increasing the supply and reach 
of water into what is otherwise an extremely arid region. Overall, data from 
official statistics show that that cultivated areas in Xinjiang have increased 
from 1,209,700 hectares in 1949 to 41,245,600 hectares in 2008. The available 
data suggests that approximately 90 percent of this area is irrigated. The 
Chinese government has recently announced potential plans to divert seawater 
from eastern provinces to Xinjiang in order to continue supplying water for 
the draught-stricken region so that economic development can continue 
unabated (China Daily, November 9 2010). 
This dramatic increase in irrigated cultivated land has been made possible 
by the reclamation of vast tracts of land identified as ‘wastelands’, which refer 
to a variety of arid landscapes that are not economically productive for 
agricultural development (Shen and Lein, 2005). This does not necessarily, 
mean, however these lands are without value economically, culturally, or 
socially. Rather, their natural state does not lend to intensive agricultural 
production. By designating them as ‘wastelands’, Chinese authorities have 
historically opened up these areas for dramatic transformation. In Xinjiang, 
this process was particularly pronounced in the post-1949 era, where it was 
                                                 
3 The figures in ‘6311’ refer to the total amount of land planned for the expansion of 
the cultivation of certain types of crops, i.e. 600,000 mu of almond, 300,00 mu of 
apricots, 100,000 mu of walnuts and 100,000 mu of other fruits (Spoor and Xiaoping 
2010). 
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believed that the “earth could be transformed through ideologically motivated 
determination” (Shapiro, 2001: 197) in “Mao’s War Against Nature” (ibid.) The 
technocratic and technicist approach to nature-society relationships has also 
continued into the contemporary period and the management of deserts and 
arid areas are primarily “contextualized in a discourse of modernity” (Williams 
1997: 344), which juxtaposes the Han-dominated modern China against the 
practices of ‘primitive’ ethnic minorities populating the ‘wastelands’ in remote 
areas. 
Overall, the policy of using water diversion and irrigation projects have 
historically served a number of interrelated goals. One goal has been the 
‘Sinicization’ of Xinjiang by the introduction of the dominant Han nationality 
of China. This, in turn, has been justified in terms of the strategic significance 
of the region, which is manifold. During the 1950s, Xinjiang was literally the 
frontier area during a time where considerable tension existed between the 
USSR and the People’s Republic. The region’s rich oil, gas and mineral 
deposits have also contributed to its importance for Beijing and, given the 
breakneck speed of development taking place since the 1980s, this dimension 
has gained further import. Similarly, that the region was predominantly 
populated by a Muslim minority has historically contributes to its perception 
by national policy makers as being a sensitive area that necessitate a firm grasp 
from the centre. The events of 11 September 2001, however, have not only 
lent more fuel to such arguments but have also been used by the central 
government to justify increasingly authoritarian measures. These seem have 
increase manifold since July 2009, the latest episode of tensions between the 
region’s Uyghur and Han populations that resulting in widespread violence.  
The ethnic-religious dimension of Xinjiang has long been a staple of 
research on China’s autonomous regions (Gladney, 2004; Bovingdon, 2004; 
Becquelin, 2000; 2004). What has been missing, however, is closer scrutiny of 
the agrarian significance of the ongoing economic, demographic and ecological 
transformation of the region. In other words, while traditionally-defined 
strategic concerns – expressed through the tropes of sensitive borders, rich  
natural resources, and combustive mix of ethnic and religious characteristics of 
minorities – seem to have guided both national policies and resulting political 
economic transformations, the resulting change in agricultural patters and 
practices too have salience to understanding the future of China’s 
development. 
4 Interpreting divergent land use changes and the role of  
the state 
The disparate processes of land use change taking place in China have come 
under increasing scrutiny in recent years. This otherwise sound literature has 
two major shortcomings. On the one hand, these processes have all been 
handled primarily as isolated phenomenon and their connections to each other 
as well as how they fit within the larger process of structural change in Chinese 
economy have remained unexplored. On the other hand, the impact of these 
processes have received a similarly narrow treatment with most studies 
focusing on single indicators of change, such as area of land under cultivation 
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or amount of food grains produced. While such studies are indeed relevant and 
necessary, their fragmented view of land use and its changes over time in China 
obscures the impact and significance of such changes.  For example, Deng et 
al. use satellite images to claim “that between 1986 and 2000 China recorded a 
net increase of cultivated land (+1.9%), which almost offset the decrease in 
average potential productivity, or bioproductivity (−2.2%). Therefore, we 
conclude that conversion of cultivated land has not hurt China's national food 
security” (2006: 372).   
While ‘total area of cultivation’ might stay relatively stable as suggested 
above, the data presented in this paper shows that, through distinct processes, 
land use change is taking place intensively as land is moving in and out of 
agriculture. This movement of land, in turn, is having significant impact on the 
location, composition and well-being of population as well as implications for 
sustainable land use. For instance, over the past fifty years, millions of idealistic 
youth from China’s urban centers were transferred into Xinjiang to populate 
newly opened agricultural plots (Shapiro, 2001). Similarly, the ongoing ‘Grain 
for Green’ program is forcing hundreds of thousands of farmers, especially 
those who make up the younger strata of society, to leave agriculture and look 
for employment either in regional rural industry or, as is more often the case, 
in urban industrial jobs in China’s booming coastal cities (Liu and Wu, 2010). 
Thus, by focusing entirely on net changes in an aggregative sense, we miss out 
on the severe impact on rural populations that result from the different 
movements of land. Vast numbers of households and their livelihoods are 
affected in each case, implying a major change in the structure of employment. 
Peasants who lose their land due to industrialization or infrastructure 
construction or are ‘strongly encouraged’ to retire their plots for ecological 
sustainability, do so with significant costs for which they may not be 
compensated appropriately. To this end, it is possible to argue that focusing 
exclusively on aggregate sums – be it total area of arable land or total amount 
of production of grains – makes an implicit assumption that ‘land here is the 
same as land there’. The three processes described in the previous section 
show that such an assumption is incorrect as it obscures the environmental, 
social, political and structural economic implications of land use change in 
China.  
Taken together and juxtaposed against the structural change literature, it is 
necessary to interrogate the precise machinations behind these movements. 
Such an inquiry is necessary both for appreciating the precise role of land in 
transition and development but also for understanding the root causes of the 
socioeconomic and environmental impacts they impart. The literature on 
structural change, as with much of development theorizing, implicitly or 
explicitly assumes this transition of land – from agriculture to industry – and 
population – from rural peasants to urban industrial workers – to be as 
necessary as it is inevitable. This perceived inevitability itself arises from the 
assumption that there is a ‘natural’ trend of development that carries societies 
from being traditional and agrarian to modern and industrial. Thus, analyses 
that are built around the putative naturalness of this transition frequently 
obscure the role of the state in managing both the pace and direction of the 
process of development and its specific implications for land use (Marton, 
2000). 
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The three processes taking place in China demonstrate the paramount role 
played by the state in orchestrating land use change of various types. This is at 
its clearest in land reclamation in Xinjiang and the rest of border provinces 
where, historically, but especially since 1949, the state has actively been 
executing a planned and well-funded process of creating new land for 
agricultural development. The creation and continued existence of the 
regiment farms clearly shows that the role of the state here is more than acting 
as a ‘spark’ to unleash a certain type of economic development. Rather, the 
central government has followed a series of long term development projects – 
the Great Western Development Strategy (Lai, 2002) being the latest example 
– in which agents controlled or directed by the state create new land and 
ensure the creation of a new agrarian population to go with it but also chart the 
precise nature of agricultural production taking place. In addition to 
contradicting the presumed ‘naturalness’ of transition, the heavy involvement 
of the state also highlights two further challenges to the narrative of linear land 
use change. First, conventional theory does not anticipate the ‘creation’ of such 
vast tracts of land out of ‘wastelands’ because transition is expected to imply 
the movement of arable land to industrial production. Second, the transfer of 
population from urban industrial (or industrializing) areas into newly created 
centers of agricultural production goes against the notion that development 
follows a pattern in which peasants are gradually relieved of their land and 
absorbed into urban industrial production processes (Akram-Lodhi and Kay, 
2009). In effect, the example of Xinjiang and other border provinces shows a 
process that goes beyond repeasantization. 
Similarly, the ‘grain for green’ program evinces another land use change 
that defies the conventional logic of agriculture to industry. The transition 
from agriculture to ecosystem services production clearly defies the core 
assumptions of structural change literature since it simply does not take into 
account the environment in general and the specific economic value created by 
ecosystem services in particular (Janicke, 1990). Once again, not only the 
direction of transition is novel but also the nature of the transition is far from 
being natural. Just as the reclamation process has been created, designed, 
executed and managed by central government authorities, the grain for green 
program was delivered at all its stages from above. The transition of rural 
populations too defies the predictable narrative. While some peasants whose 
lands have been forested have indeed sought work in rural and urban industrial 
sectors, many that remained have transitioned from being agrarian producers 
to environmental stewards, managing not agricultural production but 
ecosystem service provision. Attempts to create a market for such services 
notwithstanding, the current state of the livelihood of these new ‘producers’ 
can only be maintained by extensive state funding and involvement. 
Upon close inspection, even the most traditional seeming transition 
discussed in the context of the BTH area, where rural and peri-urban land has 
been absorbed by industrial and infrastructure development, contradicts the 
narrative of a natural transition. In such contexts, the process of dispossessing 
the rural workforce has been steadfastly managed by municipal governments 
that have acted essentially as land brokers for large-scale industrial producers. 
Their efforts have, in turn, been supported by the central government that has 
created the groundwork for such developments to take place by creating and 
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maintaining cutting edge infrastructure development programs in China’s 
coastal regions that include the construction of roads, airports and ports. Once 
again, this state-led and state-managed transition defies the simplistic 
assumptions of the structural change literature in more than one way. Not only 
the evidence shows significant state involvement but also that the peasantry 
uprooted from land does not immediately or automatically become absorbed 
by industry. Rather, many are pushed into further poverty and are forced to 
become part of the urban informal sector, a category of production that the 
development studies literature continues to treat as a short-term aberration 
despite mounting evidence to the contrary. 
In short, the state in China is actively managing the process of structural 
and associated land use change in several distinct ways. First, the state is 
actively determining when and where land moves both from and into 
agricultural production in an effort to maintain a supply of arable land that is 
perceived to be necessary for the purposes of food security. Second, the state is 
actively pushing for increased (or revitalized) ecosystem service production 
required to maintain environmental security for China’s socioeconomic 
welfare. Finally, the state is actively encouraging and managing the transition of 
areas of its own choosing from agriculture to industry. In all three processes 
which defy the natural, linear and unidirectional narrative espoused by the 
structural change literature, the state is thus directly implicated in not only the 
economic outcomes but impacts experienced by various groups of populations 
that have been actively transferred from being urban workers to peasants, 
peasants to environmental stewards or peasants to industrial laborers or 
informal workers. 
5 Conclusion 
This paper has provided a synthetic account of three major processes of land 
use change in China. In so doing, it has shown that though land use change is 
an important underlying dimension of the massive structural transformation 
accompanying China’s explosive economic growth, the dominant theoretical 
literature on structural change is not cognizant of this fact. By discussing three 
major processes of land use change, the paper also argues that the processes 
are indeed of great significance in terms of their scale and their impact on 
human and environmental well-being. In addition, the existing literature on 
China’s changing land use outcomes is not capable to adequately understand 
this impact in a holistic fashion as it primarily focuses either on narrowly 
defined programs or case studies or on meta-analyses of aggregate data. While 
the first perspective cannot help build a comprehensive picture of the impact 
of land use change in China, the latter has the effect of obscuring its impacts 
that arise from the movement of both land and people between various uses 
and occupations. Because of these shortcomings, existing analyses treat land in 
diverse states and locations as fungible, thus obfuscating the full impact of 
changes in land use. Finally, the paper argues that contrary to the implicit 
understanding of structural change literature and indeed development theory, 
the transition of land in China between its uses defies the dominant linear and 
unidirectional narrative. The three processes discussed here show that land–
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and population dependent on its livelihoods on these lands–move in different 
directions and purposes and these movements are shaped and determined by 
state vision of progress and development. 
Taken together, these insights have implications that extend beyond 
China. Clearly, the opening up of new lands for agriculture as well as for 
ecosystem service production have parallels in many other developing country 
contexts. For example, the fast emerging critical literature on land grabbing 
(Borras and Franco, 2010; Zoomers, 2010) show that control over land for the 
purposes of food production by extending the agricultural frontier deserves 
closer scrutiny as it continues to expand internationally. The policy 
implications of such developments are further complicated by a growing 
awareness to recognize the monetary value of ecosystem services, which, while 
contributing to the health of the planet at the global level, are threatening the 
livelihoods of millions of peasants around the world. Just as in the case of land 
grabbing, a critical policy discussion needs to be had regarding the trade-offs 
facing the international community in choosing between the visions of ‘strong’ 
versus ‘weak’ sustainability (Ho and Lin, 2003). Finally, the discussion 
presented here makes a contribution to long-standing debates regarding the 
future of peasantry. Rather than simply disappearing or ‘reappearing’ by lack of 
choice, the evidence in China shows that new peasantries are actively being 
created in new lands. 
As many other countries–both those classified as ‘emerging’ economies 
and also those in the category of the ‘next 11’ – are going down a similar path 
of rapid industrialization led development, the insights emerging from China 
are of paramount importance in anticipating the impacts of structural change 
on human and environmental well-being. Within this context, it is also 
important to re-emphasize one of the central arguments of this paper, namely 
that this process of structural transformation is neither ‘natural’ nor 
‘teleological’ and that it is managed and directed by the state. To this end, the 
re-emerging debate in development studies regarding the fundamental role of 
the ‘developmental state’ (Ha-Joon Chang, 2010) stands to make a welcome 
contribution to debates on land use and structural change as well. 
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